This paper considers the problem of lter design with secrecy constraints, where two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), over a Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel. This problem involves the design of transmit and receive lters which minimize the mean-square error (MSE) between the legitimate parties, whilst assuring that the eavesdropper MSE remains above a certain level. We characterize the form of the optimal transmit lter when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper employ Zero-Forcing (ZF) lters. By capitalizing on the dual problem, we also show that the original matrix optimization problem can be reduced to a simple scalar optimization problem, whose solution can be readily computed by employing a simple bisection method. Numerical results illustrate the main conclusions.
communication between two legitimate parties as well as secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper.
The basis of information-theoretic security, which builds upon Shannon's notion of perfect secrecy [1] , was laid by Wyner [2] and by Csiszár and Körner [3] who proved in seminal papers that there exist channel codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and a certain degree of data con dentiality. Wyner characterized the rate-equivocation region of the wiretap channel and its secrecy capacity (i.e., the maximum transmission rate between the legitimate parties with the eavesdropper unable to obtain any information). Ever since, the computation of the secrecy capacity of a range of communications channels has been an important research topic (e.g., see [4] ).
This paper considers secure communications from the estimation-theoretic view point. We consider the problem of lter design with secrecy constraints in the classical wiretap scenario, where the objective is to dimension transmit and receive lters that minimize the mean-square error (MSE) between the legitimate parties whilst guaranteeing a certain eavesdropper MSE level, subject to the use of Zero-Forcing (ZF) receive lters. Interestingly, this class of problems represents a natural generalization of lter design for pointto-point communications systems which has been considered in the past by several authors (e.g. [5] , [6] ). Further work on the topic of lter design in the wiretap channel scenario can be found in [7] .
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a communications scenario where a legitimate user, say Alice, communicates with another legitimate user, say Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve.
Bob and Eve observe the output of the real-valued MIMO channels given, respectively, by 1 :
where Y M and Y E are the n M and the n E -dimensional vectors of receive symbols, X is a m-dimensional vector of independent, zero-mean and unit-variance transmit symbols, and N M and N E are n M and n E -dimensional Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The n M × m matrix H M and the n E × m matrix H E contain the gains from each main and eavesdropper channel input to each main and eavesdropper channel output, respectively. The m × m matrix H T represents Alice's transmit lter. We assume that H M H T and H E H T are full column rank, which implies that n M ≥ m and n E ≥ m. This is necessary to guarantee the existence of the solutions. Bob's and Eve's estimate of the vector of input symbols are given by:
where the m × n M matrix H RM and the m × n E matrix H RE represent Bob's and Eve's receive lters, respectively. In particular we consider a scenario where:
where I is the m × m identity matrix. The justi cation for including the ZF constraints in equations (5) and (6) is to eliminate crosstalk between the various streams. Note also that the performance of linear ZF receivers is equivalent to that of optimal Wiener receivers in the regime of high SNR. Yet, one may still argue that a eavesdropper will always adopt the optimal linear receive lter -the Wiener lter -rather than the sub-optimal ZF receive lter. Interestingly, our numerical analysis will show that a situation where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper employ ZF lters is always more advantageous, in terms of information leakage, for the eavesdropper than the situation where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper employ the optimal Wiener lter. In this setting, we take as a performance metric the MSE between the estimate of the input vector and the true input vector given by:
The objective is to design the transmit lter that solves the optimization problem:
subject to the security constraint:
and to the total power constraint:
where E · denotes the expectation operator and · † denotes the transpose.
It is important to note that this approach does not guarantee perfect information-theoretic security, in the sense of [1] , [2] and [3] . 2 The design of the lters based on the MSE criteria is instead, a means to provide additional confusion in a communications system. The rationale is based on the fact that some applications require a certain maximum MSE level to function properly, so that this approach would impair further the performance of the eavesdropper by imposing a threshold on its MSE level.
OPTIMAL RECEIVE FILTERS
The design of the receive lters is trivial. In particular, the form of the receive lters follows immediately from the equations (5) and (6):
OPTIMAL TRANSMIT FILTER
In view of (13) and (14), the form of the optimal transmit lter corresponds to the solution of the optimization problem:
subject to the constraints:
and H T H † T 0. Note that by considering the change of variables:
it is possible to rewrite the optimization problem as follows:
and Z 0. One recognizes immediately that this is a standard convex optimization problem. The following theorem, which stems directly from the Karush-Kuh-Tucker optimality conditions [8] , de nes the form of the optimal transmit lter.
Theorem 1 An optimal transmit lter is, without loss of generality, given by:
where the value of the Lagrange multiplier ν is such that:
Remark: The solution embodied in Theorem 1 exhibits two distinct regimes:
i) The regime where the security constraint is inactive ii) The regime where the security constraint is active 
COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
The computation of the optimal transmit lter embodied in Theorem 1 requires nding the solution of the non-linear equation in (23), in order to determine the value of the Lagrange multiplier ν. We shall now put forth a simpler procedure to design the optimal transmit lter based on the dual of the optimization problem.
Consider the Lagrangian of the optimization problem in (18) -(20):
L (Z, ν, μ) = tr (AZ) + ν γ − tr (BZ)
Consider also the dual function of the optimization problem in (18) - (20):
where ν ≥ 0 and μ ≥ 0. It is straightforward to show that the dual function reduces to:
The dual problem of the optimization problem in (18) - (20) is now given by:
subject to:
We can employ a two step procedure to express the solution: i) optimization over μ for a xed ν; ii) optimization over ν for the optimal μ. It is straightforward to show that the optimal value of μ is given by:
Consequently, the dual optimization problem reduces to:
or, equivalently,
This is due to the fact that the positive semide nite constraint A − νB ≥ 0 is equivalent to the constraint ν ≤ λ min B The solution to the optimization problem (34) -(35) can be computed in a straightforward manner using, for example, the bisection method [9] .
The optimal values of μ in (30) and ν then de ne the optimal transmit lter as follows:
In turn, the optimal transmit lter de nes the ZF receive lters through (11) and (12).
NUMERICAL RESULTS
We shall now present a set of numerical results in order to provide further insight into the problem of lter design with secrecy constraints. We consider a 2 × 2 MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel where the main and the eavesdropper channel matrices are given by: Figure 1 depicts the values of the MSEs in the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the input power to the channels vs. the secrecy constraint with P avg = 1. Note that the solution clearly depicts the two operational regimes unveiled in Theorem 1: i) the regime where the power constraint is active but the security constraint is inactive (for smaller values of γ); and ii) the regime where the power and security constraints are active (for larger values of γ). We also include the results for the scenario where the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper use the optimal linear Wiener lters in Figure 1 (see also [10] ). Interestingly, in the relevant regime of large γ, the use of ZF lters rather than Wiener lters leads to a better MSE in the main channel without the violation of the security constraint. This is due to the fact that the transmitter can use all of the available power in such a scenario, in order to drive the MSE to a lower value.
Yet, the use of all the available power also leads to a higher eavesdropper mutual information leakage, as shown in Figure 2 . This situation, which is absent in the Wiener lters scenario, also provides a rationale for the eavesdropper to use a ZF lter rather than the optimal linear one to improve the information leakage.
CONCLUSIONS
The design of lters that minimize the MSE between the legitimate parties whilst guaranteeing a minimum MSE at the eavesdropper, subject to a power constraint, appears to be a viable option to provide reliability and a certain additional degree of security in communications systems. By concentrating on a scenario where legitimate receiver and eavesdropper receiver employ linear ZF lters, as opposed to the optimal linear Wiener lters [10] , it is possible to characterize the form of the optimal transmit lter as well as derive considerable operational insight. 
